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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
.CASES 
Paul C. Giannelli* 
L INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Arizona began its opinion in Lagerquist v. McVey1 
by noting that the interpretation of Evidence Rule 702 had "become an issue 
of nationwide concem"2 following the United States Supreme Court's 
opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals, Inc. 3 Daubert has 
indeed had a profound effect on the legal landscape-perhaps more than any 
other evidence law decision. It has triggered a heated debate in scientific 
circles4 as well as in the legal arena. 5 It has produced an extensive 
reexamination by state courts of the standard for the admissibility of 
scientific evidence,6 the codification of state rules on the subject/ as well as 
a new federal rule8 and a new uniform rule. 9 
'" Albert J. Weatherhead III and Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University. 
1. 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000). 
2. Id. at 114. 
3. 509 u.s. 579 (1993). 
4. The summer 2000 edition of Issues In Science and Techrw/ogy, the publication of the 
National Academies of Sciences and Engineering, is devoted to the subject of "Science and Law" 
and is replete with references to the Dauben decision. 
5. E.g., 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. lMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. 1 
(3d ed. 1999); 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 10-45 (1997). 
6. As a result of the reexamination that began soon after Dauben was handed down, 
numerous states explicitly rejected Frye in favor of Daube11. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, 
supra note 5, at 80-82 (listing the following as Daube11 jurisdictions: Alaska, Connecticut, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
West Virginia). In addition, a number of states had rejected Frye before Daube11 was decided. See 
id. at 82-84 (listing Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, 
North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming). 
7. See HAW. R. EVID. 702 ("In determining the issue of assistance to the trier of fact, the 
court may consider the trustworthiness and validity of the scientific technique or mode of analysis 
employed by the proffered expert."); IND. R. EVID. 702(b) ("Expert scientific testimony is 
admissible only if the court is satisfied that the scientific principles upon which the expert testimony 
rests are reliable."); OHIO R. EviD. 702(C): 
The witness' testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other 
specialized information. To the extent that the testimony reports the result of a 
procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all of the fol-
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At one point in its opinion, the Lagerquist majority stated that it did "not 
believe different tests should apply in civil cases; to the contrary, rules 
determining the competency of evidence should apply across the board, 
whether the case is on the civil or criminal calendar." 10 But why? In this 
essay, I argue that courts have often failed to appreciate the significant 
differences in criminal and civil cases in this context. 
ll. DEATH, IMPRISONMENT AND ERRONEOUS CONVICTION 
First, the stakes are different in criminal and civil litigation, as illustrated 
by Barefoot v. Estelle, 11 decided before Daubert and cited in Logerquist. 12 In 
the death penalty phase of the case, the prosecution offered psychiatric 
testimony concerning Barefoot's future dangerousness. 13 One psychiatrist, 
Dr. James Grigson, without ever examining Barefoot, testified that "there 
was a 'one hundred percent and absolute' chance that Barefoot would 
commit future acts of criminal violence. "14 On October 24, 1984, Thomas 
Barefoot was executed based on "junk science. "15 The Barefoot Court 
lowing apply: (1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is 
based is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted 
knowledge, facts, or principles; (2) The design of the procedure, test, or 
experiment reliably implements the theory; (3) The particular procedure, test, 
or experiment was conducted in a way that will yield an accurate result. 
Michigan had adopted its provision before Daubert. See MICH. R. EVID. 702 (requiring expert 
testimony be based on "recognized" scientific, technical, or other knowledge"). 
8. FED. R. EVID. 702: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, slcill, experience, training or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony 
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts ofthe case. 
The italicized clause became effective on Dec. 1, 2000. 
9. UNlF. R. EVID. 702 (effective June 1999). 
10. 1 P.3d at 127. 
11. 463 u.s. 880 (1983). 
12. 1 P.3d at 126. 
13. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884. Future dangerousness was a qualifying factor under the 
Texas death penalty statute. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.07l(b)(2) (Vernon 1981) 
{requiring a jury finding that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts 
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society"). It continues to be factor. /d. at 
art. 37.011(2)(b)(l) (Supp. 2001). 
14. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919 (BlacknJUn, I., dissenting) (quoting from record). 
15. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 220 
(1991). One could favor the death penalty and "yet still recoil at the thought that a junk science 
fringe of psychiatry . . . could decide who will be sent to the gallows. ld. 
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admitted evidence "at the brink of quackery. "16 Justice Blaclanun, the 
author of the Daubert opinion, dissented: 
In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for 
me. One may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages, 
but when a person's life is at stake ... a requirement of greater 
reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony 
of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by 
the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words, 
equates with death itself. 17 
Furthermore, the DNA exonerations establish a connection between 
expert testimony and erroneous convictions. In Actual Innocence Barry 
Scheck, Peter Neufeld and Jim Dwyer examined 62 of the 67 DNA 
exonerations secured through Cardozo Law School's Innocence Project to 
ascertain what factors contributed to these miscarriages of justice; one of the 
more astounding conclusions was that a third of these cases involved "tainted 
or fraudulent science." 18 Some of these cases involved the death penalty, 
and the Illinois misconduct cases played a role in the Governor's moratorium 
on executions in that state. 19 
ill. MISCONDUCT 
Second, the abuse of scientific evidence in criminal cases is well-
documented.20 Forged fmgerprint evidence/1 fake autopsies,22 and perjured 
16. See George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness,~ Psychiatric Testimony, and 
Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977). 
17. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916. 
18. BARRY SCHECK, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 246 (2000). 
19. See Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Verdict Errors, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 
2000. The infamous Cruz and Hernandez prosecutions occurred in lllinois. See EDWARD 
CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JuRIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE 
OF DNA EVIDENCE TO EsTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 44-46 (1996). 
20. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The 
Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 439 (1997) (discussing the 
need for independent assessment of scientific evidence to avoid abuse of scientific proof). 
21. See generally Boris Geller et al., A ChronOlogical Review of Fingerprint Forgery, 44 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 963 (1999) (discussing history of fingerprint forgeries); Mark Hansen, Troopers' 
Wrongdoing Taints Cases, 80 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 22 (discussing New York police officers 
fabrication of fingerprint evidence in numerous cases). 
22. See generally Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist's Plea Adds to Tumwil: Discovery of 
Possibly Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense Challenges, 79 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 24 
("If the prosecution theory was that death was caused by a Martian death ray, then that was what 
[the pathologist) reported."); Chip Brown, Pathologist Accused of Falsifying Autopsies, Botching 
Trial Evidence Forensics, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at A24 ("[F]orrner Dallas County assistant 
medical examiner Linda Norton was quoted as saying [Dr.] Erdmann routinely performs 'made-to-
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testimony23 have all been reported. The Department of Justice's 1997 report 
on the FBI laboratory, issued by the Inspector General, graphically portrayed 
negligence, misconduct, and other shortcomings -of the premier crime 
laboratory in the country.24 The investigation found scientifically flawed 
testimony, inaccurate testimony, testimony beyond the competence of 
examiners, improperly prepared laboratory reports, insufficient 
documentation of test_ results, inadequate record management and retention, 
and failures of management to resolve serious and credible allegations of 
incompetence.25 The report's recommendations are revealing because they 
are so basic. They include (1) seeking accreditation of the FBI laboratory by 
the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory 
Accreditation Board; (2) requiring examiners in the Explosives Unit to have 
scientific backgrounds in chemistry, metallurgy, or engineering; (3) 
mandating that each examiner who performs work prepare and sign a 
separate report instead of having one report "without attribution to individual 
order autopsies that support a police version of a story."'); Roy Bragg, New Clues May be Dug 
from Grave; Furor Touches on Autopsies, Brains, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 28, 1992, at 1 ("[C]all 
him McErdmann, ... He's like McDonald's-billions served.") (quoting Dallam County District 
Attorney Barry Blackwell). 
23. See, e.g., In reInvestigation of theW. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 
S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993) (ordering state officials to notify prisoners of their right to file habeas 
actions because a chief serologist falsified test results in as many as 134 cases from 1979 to 1989). 
The accompanying report states: 
The acts of misconduct on the part of [serologist] Zain included (1) overstating 
the strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on 
individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic 
matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items of 
evidence had been tested, when only a single item had been tested; (5) 
reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory 
records; (1) grouping results to create the erroneous impression that genetic 
markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to report 
conflicting results; {9) failing to conduct or to report conducting additional 
testing to resolve conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect 
when testing supported only a match with the victim; and (11) reporting 
scientifically impossible or improbable results. 
ld. at 516. 
24. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI LABORATORY: 
INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-
RELATED AND OTHER CASES (April 1997) [hereinafter cited as I.G. REPORT]. See also JOHN F. 
KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE 2 (1998): 
The findings were alanning. FBI examiners had given scientifically flawed, 
inaccurate, and overstated testimony under oath in court; had altered the lab 
reports of examiners to give them a pro-prosecutorial slant, and had failed to 
document tests and examinations from which they drew incriminating 
conclusions, thus ensuring that their work could never be properly checked. 
25. I.G. REPoRT, supra note 24, Executive Summary, pt. l, section A. 
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examiners"; (4) providing for the review of analytical reports by the unit 
chief;26 (5) preparing adequate case files to support reports;27 (6) monitoring 
court testimony in order to preclude examiners from testifying to matters 
beyond their expertise or in ways that are "unprofessional"; and (7) 
developing written protocols for scientific procedures. 
IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Third, the adversary context differs in criminal and civil cases.28 The 
overwhelming number of criminal defendants, upwards of 80 percent in 
some jurisdictions, are indigent. 29 Consequently, most defendants must rely 
on government attorneys, public defenders, or government-paid private 
attorneys to defend them. 30 In short, the government is responsible for the 
defense as well as for the prosecution. 
The right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. 31 
There is good reason to believe that effective counsel is often not provided. 
The compensation schedule in some states almost ensures inadequate 
representation. 
In too many states, serving as counsel to the indigent is a fast way 
to join their ranks. For instance, in Mississippi, the maximum fee 
26. "Our central point is that peer review by qualified personnel is an essential aspect of a 
high-perfonning forensic science laboratory. The Rudolph matter, certain conclusions in the 
Oklahoma City report, and other cases demonstrate the importance of vigorous, substantive peer 
review." I d. at pt. I. 
27. "The Rudolph files and some of Martz's work underscore the importance of case files 
containing all the documentation necessary for another appropriately qualified examiner to be able 
to understand and replicate the examiners's data and analysis. We encountered the problem of 
incomplete or missing documentation in many case files." ld. at pt. I. 
28. The Court in Daubert stated that "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of 
attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 596 
(1993). Consequently, assessing how well the adversary system functions is an important issue in 
the criminal versus civil context. 
29. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 25 (9th ed. 1999) ("The 
most complete national survey estimated the overall felony indigency rate at 48%, but a later 
sampling of felony defendants in the 75 largest counties indicated that approximately 80% receive 
court appointed attorneys."). ' 
30. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 352 (1963) (holding that the right to 
counsel applies to the states). "[l]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for 
him." ld. at 344. 
31. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("It has long been recognized 
that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."); see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (reaffirming the right to counsel includes the right to effective 
assistance of counsel). 
108 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
for non-death penalty cases is $1,000, plus a token amount for 
office overhead. In certain rural sections of Texas the limit is 
$800. In Virginia, $305 is the most a court-appointed counsel can 
receive for defending a client in a felony punishable by less than 
twenty years. A kid selling sodas on a summer weekend at 
Virginia beach would make more money. 32 
A recent New York Times article captured the essential truth here: Poor 
Legal Work Common For Innocents on Death Row.33 
Ineffective assistance cases involving scientific evidence are not hard to 
find. For example, in Baylor v. Estellt?' the Ninth Circuit wrote: 
We have difficulty understanding how reasonably competent 
counsel would not recognize "the obvious exculpatory potential of 
semen evidence in a sexual assault case," particularly when the 
criminalist's report plainly indicates that the donor was an ABO 
nonsecretor whereas Baylor was an ABO type "0" secretor and 
that this 'would thus eliminate' Baylor as the perpetrator unless a 
test . . . on a liquid semen sample showed that he mimicked a 
nonsecretor .... Whether or not Stockwell's report was itself 
conclusive, it was one test away from tilting the scale powerfully in 
Baylor's direction. 35 
Similarly, another court found ineffectiveness where defense counsel knew 
that gunshot residue testimony was "critical" but nevertheless failed to 
"depose the State's expert witness nor ... bothered to consult with any other 
expert in the field. "36 Other cases, both federal37 and state,38 are of the same 
ilk. 
32. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 18, at 188. 
33. Dirk Johnson, Poor Legal Work Common For Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 5, 2000, at Al. 
34. 94 F.3d 1321 {9th Cir. 1996). 
35. /d. at 1324. See also Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978) ("The 
failure of defense counsel to seek [expert services] when the need is apparent deprives an accused of 
adequate representation in violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel."); United States a ret. 
Foster v. Gilmore, 35 F. Supp. 2d 626, 630 {N.D. Ill. 1999) ("This court finds inexplicable 'and 
wholly ineffective' defense counsel's failure to consult a psychiatric expert prior to or even during 
the trial."). 
36. Troedel v. Wainwright, 667 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
Even the third-year law student knew the defense needed a psychiatric expert 
witness. That witness was to be Dr. Kling. As a result of trial counsel's 
woefully deficient performance, however, Dr. Kling was not provided with 
sufficient information and, as a result, his testimony not only failed to help the 
defense, it significantly hindered it. Kling's report (which he now 
acknowledges was inaccurate) permitted the prosecution to tum Kling's trial 
testimony against Bloom, and it gave the prosecution the ammunition it needed 
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The Justice Department's study on DNA exonerations also underscored 
this point. A professor of forensic science wrote: 
One problem that DNA testing will not remedy is inadequate legal 
counsel. In case after case reported here, defense counsel failed to 
consult competent scientific experts. Even a neophyte forensic 
serologist would have detected the problems with the prosecution's 
serological evidence in the Dotson case. It is also clear that in case 
after case, defense counsel failed to review the case notes of the 
prosecution's forensic serologists. Even a layperson would have 
seen that Fred Zains's written reports and sworn testimony were 
contradicted by his case notes. Again, one has to reflect on the 
to secure guilty verdicts of first degree murder with special circumstances 
[death penalty] on all three counts. 
Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267, 1278 (9th Cir. 1997). 
37. E.g., Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1208-11 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding ineffective 
assistance in penalty phase of capital murder case for failing to present evidence of defendant's 
mental retardation/neurological impairment, by acquiescing to prosecutor's suggestion that experts 
requested by defense be treated as coun-appointed rather than defense experts, and by failing to 
challenge expen repons); Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 701, 709 (8th Cir. 1995): 
In a capital murder case whether or not the alleged murder weapon . . . had 
blood matching the victim's constituted an issue of the utmost imponance. 
Under these circumstances, a reasonable defense lawyer would take some 
measures to understand the laboratory tests performed and the inferences that 
one could logically draw from the results. At the very least, any reasonable 
attorney under the circumstances would study the state's laboratory repon with 
sufficient care so that if the prosecution advanced a theory at trial that was at 
odds with the serology evidence, the defense would be in a position to expose 
it on cross-examination. 
See also Foster v. Lockhan, 9 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding defense counsel's failure to 
pursue an impotency defense in a rape case constituted ineffective assistance); United States v. 
Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1418 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that attorney's failure to consult 
handwriting expen made out a viable claim of ineffective assistance); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 
1575, 1580-81 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that defense counsel's failure to have quilt examined for 
gunshot residue constituted ineffective assistance); Gilnwre, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 630 ("This coun 
fmds inexplicable-and wholly ineffective-defense counsel's failure to consult a psychiatric expen 
prior to or even during the trial."). 
38. E.g., People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 598-600 (Cal. 1979) (fmding that defense 
counsel's failure to seek expen advice as to whether the defendant was under the influence of drugs 
at the time of the offense constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); Moore v. State, 827 S.W .2d 
213, 214-15 (Mo. 1992) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to request serological test). In the 
case of State v. Hicks, the coun found that defense counsel's failure to obtain DNA analysis was not 
a strategic or tactical decision: 
Before the trial, [defense counsel} knew that the root tissue of hair specimens 
could be subject to DNA testing at cenain out-of-state laboratories and he knew 
of the technology used for that testing. He did not discuss this with his client 
or with the district attorney, or petition the coun to have this test performed or 
do anything to pursue such testing. 
536 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
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likelihood that numerous innocent persons are presently 
incarcerated because of the inadequacy of their attorneys. 39 
V. ACCESS TO DEFENSE ExPERTS 
Access to expert testimony is another major difference between criminal 
and civil cases. 40 Obtaining expert assistance is generally not difficult for the 
prosecution. The prosecution has access to the services of state, county, or 
metropolitan crime laboratories. In addition, federal forensic laboratories 
often provide their services to state law enforcement agencies. For example, 
the services of the FBI Laboratory "are rendered free of cost to contributing 
agencies" and available to "all duly constituted state, county, and municipal 
law enforcement agencies in the United States. " 41 These services, which are 
provided without charge, include both the examination of evidence and the 
court appearance of the expert. In contrast, forensic laboratory services are 
not generally available to criminal defendants. A survey of approximately 
300 crime laboratories revealed that "[f]ifty-seven percent . . . of the 
responding laboratories would only examine evidence submitted by law 
enforcement officials. " 42 
In Ake v. Oklalzoma43 the United States Supreme Court for the first time 
recognized a due process right to expert assistance for indigents when the 
matter about which the expert is to testify is likely to be a significant factor 
39. Walter F. Rowe, Forward, in CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE, supra 
note 19, at xvii-xviii. See also id. at 68 ("ineffective counsel at [Piszelc's] trial (trial counsel never 
requested DNA testing"}; KELLY & WEARNE, supra note 24, at 26-27 ("You can ignore high 
profile cases like OJ Simpson. That is not typical."). 
40. The Lagerquist majority wrote: "Of course, no one can quantify how many times juries 
have been fooled by junlc science, although it undoubtedly has occurred, or how many times this 
has favored the prosecution or the defense, the plaintiff or the defendant." Logerquist v. Me Vey, 1 
P.3d 113, 130 (Ariz. 2000). We do, however, lcnow that the prosecution relies on expert testimony 
more than the defense. "About one quarter of the citizens who had served on juries which were 
presented with scientific evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have 
changed their verdicts-from guilty to not guilty." Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects 
of Forensic Science in the Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1748 (1987}. 
41. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE ix (rev. ed. 
1994); 28 C.P.R. § 0.85(g) (2000} (authorizing the FBI lab "to provide, without cost, technical and 
scientific assistance, . . . for all duly constituted law enforcement agencies, . . . which may desire 
to avail themselves of the service"}. 
42. Joseph Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nation's Criminalistics 
Laboratories, 30 ]. FORENSIC SCI. 10, 13 (1985}. 
43. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Alee's attorney requested a psychiatric evaluation at state expense to 
prepare an insanity defense. The trial court refused, and although insanity was the only contested 
issue at trial, no psychiatrist testified on this issue. ld. at 72. 
33:0103 SCIENI'IFIC EVIDENCE IN ClVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 111 
at trial. 44 The importance of Ake is self-evident. The first National 
Academy of Sciences Repprt on DNA evidence commented: "Because of the 
potential power of DNA evidence, authorities must make funds available to 
pay for expert witnesses . . . . "'45 
Nevertheless, a number of sources indicate that the lack of defense 
experts continues to be a problem.46 In 1990, the National Law Journal 
published the results of a six-month investigation of capital murder defenses 
in the South. One of the "key findings" concerned defense experts: "Judges 
routinely deny lawyers' requests for expert/investigative fees. "47 Another 
article reported that in "DNA cases in Oklahoma and Alabama, ... the 
defense did not retain any experts, because the presiding judge had refused to 
authorize funds. "48 In addition, a 1992 study of indigent defense systems 
noted that the "greatest disparities occur in the areas of investigators and 
expert witnesses, with the prosecutors possessing more resources. "49 
44. We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity 
at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the 
Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance 
on this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one. 
Id. at 74. 
45. NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 149 (1992). 
The report also includes the following passage: "Defense counsel must have access to adequate 
expert assistance, even when the admissibility of the results of analytical techniques is not in 
question, because there is still a need to review the quality of the laboratory work and the 
interpretation of the results." ld. at 147. 
46. See KELLY & WEARNE, supra note 24, at 27 ("Experts cost money; the vast majority of 
defendants don't have it, and the courts are often reluctant to spend it by authorizing the funds to 
pay for a defense expert. The result has been what some experts have termed an economic 
presumption of guilt."); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 802 (6th ed. 2000) ("Generally speaking the courts have read Ake narrowly, and have 
refused to require appointment of an expert unless it is absolutely essential to the defense."). 
47. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L 
L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30. As part of the investigation, sixty death row trial lawyers were 
interviewed. "54.2% felt courts provided inadequate investigation and expert funds." ld. at 40. 
One attorney, who was appointed to represent a death row inmate in Georgia, had his request for 
the appointment of an expert denied. He commented, "There's an economic presumption of guilt 
. . . . The district attorney has all the resource;s of the state crime lab, and we have to go hat in 
hand to the judge and the DA on every request." Id. at 38. See also A Study of Representation in 
Capital Cases in TexllS, 56 TEX. B.J. 333, 408 (Apr. 1993) (Report of The Spangenberg Group 
prepared for the Texas State Bar) ("There is a serious underfunding of essential expert services and 
other expenses in capital trials and appeals."). 
48. Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Tahts the Witness Stand, 262 SCI. 
AM. 46, 53 (May 1990). See also Dubose v. State, 662 So. 2d 1189, 1192-93 (Ala. 1995) 
(discussing Ake violations for failure to provide indigent defendant with funds for DNA expert); 
Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 439 (Ark. 1991) (finding reversible error where the trial judge 
denied motion for appointment of defense expert because no available funds). 
49. R. HANSON, INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL 100 (1992) 
(study by the National Center for State Courts). 
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VI. INADEQUATE DISCOVERY 
The criminal justice system cannot adequately deal with scientific 
evidence without pretrial discovery, and good science is the antithesis of 
"trial by ambush." Nevertheless, pretrial discovery of expert testimony is 
far more extensive in civil than in criminal cases. 50 Discovery depositions 
and interrogatories are not available in criminal trials in the overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions. Timothy Spencer was the first person executed 
based on DNA evidence.51 Yet, when the defense sought discovery of the 
prosecution expert's "work notes," which formed the basis of his report, the 
motion was denied, and the Virginia Supreme Court upheld this ruling.52 
There are other DNA discovery cases in which the derual of discovery was 
upheld.53 
Vll. UNVALIDATED EXPERT TESTIMONY 
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Cannichaef4 the United States Supreme Court 
declared that the 
objective of [Daubert's gatekeeping] requirement is to ensure the 
reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain 
that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies 
or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of 
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the 
relevant field. 55 
Unfortunately, the "practices" in some fields of forensic science are 
seriously deficient. In many areas little systematic research has been 
conducted to validate the field's basic premises and techniques, and often 
there is no justifiable reason why such research would not be feasible. 
50. See Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. 
REv. 791, 821-25 (1991). 
51. Murderer Put to Death in Virginia: First U.S. Execution Based on DNA Tests, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994. 
52. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Va. 1989) (reaffinning "'[t]here is no 
general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case'") (citations omitted). 
53. E.g., State v. Dykes, 847 P.2d 1214 (Kan. 1993) (holding that denial of request for the 
data base used to determine DNA match did not deny a fair trial; defense argued that accused's 
"substantial" Cherokee ancestry made this data important); Sadler v. State, 846 P.2d 377 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1993) (finding prosecution's failure to tum over "inconclusive" DNA report did not 
violate due process). 
54. 526 u.s. 137 (1999). 
55. ld. at 152. 
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A. Questioned Document Examinations 
In 1995 a federal district court in United States v. Starzecpyzef6 
concluded that "the testimony at the Daubert hearing firmly established that 
forensic document examination, despite the existence of a certification 
program, professional journals and other trappings of science, cannot, after 
Daubert, be regarded as 'scientific ... knowledge.'"57 The court further 
stated that "while scientific principles may relate to aspects of handwriting 
analysis, they have little or nothing to do with the day-to-day tasks 
performed by [Forensic Document Examiners] . . . . [T]his attenuated 
relationship does not transform the FDE into a scientist. "58 
Nevertheless, the court did not exclude handwriting comparison 
testimony. 59 Instead, it admitted the testimony as based on "technical" 
knowledge.60 This controversy has been exhaustively covered in other 
articles, 61 but the critical point for present purposes is not in dispute-
empirical validation is possible but is only beginning to be done. 
B. Hair Comparisons 
In the past courts have upheld the admissibility of hair evidence under 
Frye. 62 After Daubert was decided, however, the district court in Williamson 
v. Reynolds, 63 a federal habeas case, took a closer look at hair comparison 
evidence. There, an expert testified that hair samples were "microscopically 
consistent. "64 The expert then went on to explain what this meant: "In other 
words, hairs are not an absolute identification, but they either came from this 
individual or there "could be another individual somewhere in the world that 
would have the same characteristics to their hair. "65 The district court noted 
that the "expert did not explain which of the 'approximately' 25 
characteristics were consistent, any standards for detennining whether the 
56. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
57. ld. at 1038. 
58. ld. at 1041. 
59. ld. at 1049. 
60. The court also approved a jury instruction, which stated that "FDEs offer practical, 
rather than scientific expertise." I d. 
61. See, e.g., Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: Handwriting 
Comparison, 35 CRIM. L. BULL. 517 (1999); D. Michael Risinger eta!.; Brave New "Post-Daubert 
World"-A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405 (1998). 
62. E.g., People v. Watkins, 259 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Mich. App. 1977). 
63. Willia..mson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995), ajJ'd on other 
grounds, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
64. ld. at 1554 (quoting from the trial court record). 
65. ld. 
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samples were consistent, how many persons could be expected to share this 
same combination of characteristics, or how he arrived at his conclusions. "66 
Moreover, the district court professed that it had "been unsuccessful in its 
attempts to locate any indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets 
any of the requirements"67 of Daubert. The court observed: "Although the 
hair expert may have followed procedures accepted in the community of hair 
experts, the human hair comparison results in this case were, nonetheless, 
scientifically unreliable. "68 Finally, as is often the case, the prosecutor 
exacerbated the problem by stating in closing argument, "[T]here's a 
match. "69 Even the state court of criminal appeals misinterpreted the 
evidence, writing that the "[h]air evidence placed [petitioner] at the 
decedent's apartment. "70 The district court decision was subsequently 
reversed because due process, not Daubert, provided the controlling standard 
for habeas review. 71 The defendant, however, was later exonerated by 
exculpatory DNA evidence, and as Scheck and his colleagues observe, "[t]he 
hair evidence was patently unreliable. "72 
Unfortunately, later cases-even in Daubert jurisdictions-have not 
continued the type of scrutiny displayed by the district court in Williamson. 
For example, in Johnson v. Commonwealth13 the Kentucky Supreme Court 
upheld the admissibility of hair evidence.74 Indeed, because hair comparison 
evidence had been accepted by Kentucky courts and other states' courts, it 
held that courts could take judicial notice that hair comparison evidence was 
scientifically reliable.75 Judicial notice typically extends only to indisputable 
66. ld. 
67. ld. at 1558. 
68. ld. 
69. ld. at 1557 (quoting from the trial record). 
70. ld. (quoting state court) 
71. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1522-23 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
72. SCHECK, ET AL., supra note 18, at 146. 
Not until December 1985, three years after the murder, did the state finish its 
first report on the hair examination. A trained hair man named Melvin Hett 
concluded that thirteen hairs found around the victim's body appeared to have 
come from the head and pubis of Dennis Fritz. Another four hairs from the 
murder scene were linked to Ron Williamson. By itself, though, the hair 
report was not strong enough to prove capital murder. 
ld. at 134. 
73. 12 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 1999). The court also wrote: "Under Daubert, adopted by this 
Court . . . the Frye test of general acceptance is but one factor to be considered in determining the 
admissibility of scientific evidence under FRE (or KRE) 702." Id. at 261. 
74. ld. at 263-64. 
75. ld. at 262-63. The dissent believed that hair comparison evidence should have been 
scrutinized in accordance with Daubert, that the level of acceptance of scientific techniques can 
change over time, and that judicial notice "should be reserved for the rare occasion when the 
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facts. 76 Similarly, the Hawaii Supreme Court, another court that has adopted 
Daubert, ruled that "[b]ecause the scientific principles and procedures 
underlying hair and fiber evidence are well-established and of proven 
reliability, the evidence in the present case can be treated as 'technical 
knowledge.' Thus, an independent reliability determination was 
unnecessary. "77 
What we know about hair comparisons is this: they are often misused.78 
In one case, the expert testified that the crime scene hair sample "was 
unlikely to match anyone" other than the defendant, Edward Honak:er.79 
This conclusion was a gross overstatement. At best, the expert could have 
testified that the crime-scene hairs were "consistent with" the defendant's 
exemplars, which means that they could have come from Honaker or 
thousands of other people. Honaker spent ten years in prison before being 
exonerated by DNA analysis. Indeed, another hair examiner would later 
opine that "the hairs were not comparable. "80 "Roger Coleman was 
executed in 1992 for a slaying in rural Virginia. 81 The same expert who had 
testified against Honaker also testified against Coleman-and in the same 
evidence sought to be admitted is seemingly beyond dispute, such as, for example, evidence that the 
sun rises every day in the east, or aclrnowledgment of the law of gravity." /d. at 267 (Stumbo, J., 
dissenting). 
76. FED. R. EVID. 20l(b) (judicially noticed fact is one not subject to reasonable dispute). 
See 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ch. 30 (3d ed. 1998). 
77. State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32, 44 (Haw. 1997); see also McGrew v. State, 682 N.E.2d 
1289, 1292 (Ind. 1997) (holding hair comparison admissible, finding that it was "more a 'matter of 
observation by persons with specialized knowledge' than a matter of scientific principles"); 
McCarty v. State, 904 P.2d llO, 125 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (upholding the admissibility of hair 
comparison evidence). 
78. See, e.g., Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison 
Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 227 (1996) (exploring the validity of hair comparison analysis). 
79. CONNORS, ET AL., supra note 19, at 58; see also HARLAN LEVY, AND THE BLOOD 
CRIED OUT: A PROSECUTOR'S SPELLBINDING ACCOUNT OF THE POWER OF DNA 153 (1996) 
(acknowledging that "[t]here was no question that the state hair expert [at Honaker's trial] had 
overstated the distinctiveness of the hair recovered from the victim's shorts in his trial testimony"). 
80. JOHN TUCKER, MAY GoD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
345 (1997). 
/d. 
With the cooperation of a conscientious prosecutor, Kate Germond had the 
hairs reexamined by one of the world's leading experts on hair analysis and 
DNA tests performed on sperm found on a vaginal swab taken from the victim 
at the time of the rape. The hair expert said that in his opinion the hairs were 
not comparable, and the DNA analysis proved beyond doubt that Honaker was 
not the rapist. 
81. /d. 
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manner. 82 The United States Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer's mistake in 
filing Coleman's state collateral appeal (one day late) precluded federal 
habeas review.83 Serious questions about Coleman's innocence have been 
raised, and the prosecution's use of the hair evidence was, to say the least, 
suspect. 84 While conducting research for his book on the Coleman case, 
Joh.ii Tucker interviewed the trial judge: 
Years later, in response to the author's question about what 
evidence in the case he thought had the most powerful impact on 
the jury, Judge Persin said it was Elmer Gist's testimony about the 
comparison of the pubic hairs. It was, Judge Persin observed, the 
first and only testimony that seemed to tie Roger Coleman to the 
murder specifically. 85 
As Tucker correctly notes: "A finding of consistency is highly subjective, 
and experts may and often do disagree about such a fmding. "86 
Nevertheless, at trial the prosecutor "described, with great emphasis, the 
scientific evidence, and especially the comparison of the pubic hairs, 
asserting that 'it would be extremely unlikely that anyone else would have 
hair that would be consistent with this hair.' "87 Unfortunately for Coleman, 
the defense counsel failed to challenge this statement. 88 Tucker describes the 
testimony as follows: 
82. ld. ("In October 1994, after nearly ten years in prison, Edward Honaker was released. 
The state forensic expert who had testified in 1985 that the hairs were comparable and unlikely to 
have come from anyone other than Honaker was Elmer Gist."). 
83. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,727,757 (1991). 
84. See TUCKER, supra note 80, at 34-35; see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Was An Innocent Man 
Executed?, AM. LAW. (Dec. 1997) ("I'd put the odds that Coleman was innocent somewhere above 
fifty-fifty .... The state's hair evidence was shown (after the trial) to be far from probative and fur 
from reliable."); Ronald J. Tabak, Death Penalty Be Not Proud, 84 A.B.A. I. 80 {Ian. 1998) 
(reviewing Tucker's book and noting that "defense counsel did not seriously challenge a highly 
dubious hair comparison that greatly influenced the jury. The lawyer who dealt with the evidence 
had never examined a hair expert before."). 
85. See TUCKER, supra note 80, at 75. "According to Gist, he had microscopically 
compared the pubic hair found on Wanda McCoy with those removed from Roger Coleman on 
March 13, and they were 'consistent.'" ld. at 51. 
ld. 
Unlike fingerprints, hairs are not positive identifiers, and unlike blood types, 
there is no scientifically accepted figure for the number or percentage of people 
whose hair is "consistent" with one another .... But as Jack Davidson and 
Mickey McGlothlin knew, or would soon find out, Elmer Gist had often 
testified, and would surely testify again, that it is "possible, but unlikely" that 
consistent hairs could come from different people. 
86. ld. 
87. ld. at 63 (quoting the prosecuting attorney). 
88. /d. at 64 ("The scientific evidence was ignored altogether, leaving unchallenged 
McGlothlin's exaggerated claim about the importance of the pubic hairs."). 
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Nor did [the expert] compare the pubic hairs found on Wanda [the 
victim] with anyone other than Coleman and Wanda herself-not 
even her husband Brad. Nevertheless, when he asserted that he 
had made a comparison of those hairs with Roger's pubic hair, and 
that the hairs were "consistent" with each other, meaning, he said, 
that is was "possible, but unlikely" that the hairs found on Wanda 
could have come from anyone other than Roger Coleman, the 
jurors exchanged glances and settled back in their seats. 89 
Two points are noteworthy. First, there is an obvious (and embarrassing) 
lack of empirical validation in this context. Second, the courts talk of 
"judicial notice" of hair evidence, the "reliability" of hair evidence, and the 
"general acceptance" of hair evidence without specifying any limitations. 
"General acceptance" in the scientific community that an examiner may 
validly testify that hair evidence is "consistent with" the accused's hair is a 
world away from "general acceptance" that a positive identification is 
possible-and yet such an important qualification is rarely specified in the 
cases. 
Vill. CIVILCASES 
The above issues typically do not arise in civil litigation. The problems 
associated with expert and scientific evidence in civil trials are quite 
different. A commonly-cited issue in civil cases concerns "hired guns. "90 
This can, no doubt, be a problem in some criminal cases, but the extensive 
use of government-employed crime laboratory personnel and medical 
·examiners significantly reduces prosecution reliance on outside experts, and 
inadequate funding for the defense precludes the problem of selling testimony 
to the "highest bidder. "91 
Another prominent issue in civil cases involves causation .in toxic tort 
litigation, as in Daubert. Causation is rarely an issue in criminal law-
typically, it is limited to the cause of death in homicide prosecutions. 
Moreover, the toxic tort cases raise policy issues above and beyond the 
reliability of expert testimony. If litigation indeed drove an effective drug, 
such as Bendectin, from the market, even in the absence of valid scientific 
evidence that it caused birth defects,92 serious public health issues are raised. 
89. ld. at 76. 
90. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113. 
91. In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 {5th Cir. 1986) 
{"[E]xperts whose opinions are available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of 
law."). 
92. See HUBER, supra note 15, ch. 7 (discussing Bendectin). 
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Similarly, even if no scientific evidence establishes a causal link between 
silicone breast implants and connective tissue disease, the fact that a drug 
company failed to conduct any tests on its product until litigation commenced 
raises countervailing policy issues. 93 These types of concerns are simply not 
part of criminal trials. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Daubert decision contained a number of ambiguities. One concerned 
whether Daubert liberalized the standard for admissibility. There is some 
language in the opinion that pointed in this direction, 94 and a number of 
courts have adopted this position. 95 The polygraph cases are a good 
example. In United States v. Posado,96 the Fifth Circuit stated that "the 
rationale underlying this circuitDs per se rule against admitting polygraph 
evidence did not survive Daubert. "91 
There is, however, language in Daubert that pointed the other way,98 
particularly the Court's emphasis on the "gatekeeper" function of the trial 
court. 911 The federal cases that reexamined handwriting (United States v. 
93. Rebecca Dresser et al., Breast lmphmts Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 WIS. 
L. REV. 705. 
94. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993): 
Given the Rules' pennissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on 
expen testimony that does not mention "general acceptance," the assertion that 
the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made "general 
acceptance" the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony. That 
austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials. 
95. E.g., United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (polygraph) ("The 
Federal Rules of Evidence, although concededly more liberal than the Frye test, still require a 
determination that the proffered scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable."); Borawick v. 
Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[B]y loosening the strictures on scientific evidence set by 
Frye, Daubert reinforces the idea that there should be a presumption of admissibility of evidence."); 
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 568 (6th Cir. 1993} ("We find that the DNA testimony easily 
meets the more liberal test set out by the Supreme Court in Daubert."). 
96. 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995). 
97. Id. at 429. 
98. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590: 
{l]n order to quality as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion must 
be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by 
appropriate validation-i.e., "good grounds," based on what is known. In 
short, the requirement that an expen's testimony pertain to "scientific 
knowledge" establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 
99. ld. at 592-93. In Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997), the Court 
commented: "Thus, while the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat 
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Starzecpyzel) 100 and hair analysis (Williamson v. Reynolds)101 undercut the 
notion that Daubert is a more permissive standard. By the time Kumho was 
decided, a federal district court would conclude that Kumho "plainly invit[es] 
a reexamination even of 'generally accepted' venerable, technical fields. "102 
For the reasons outlined in this essay, I welcome this much needed and long 
overdue scrutiny of scientific evidence in criminal prosecution. 
broader range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible under Frye, they leave in 
place the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial judge in screening such evidence." (emphasis added). 
100. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
101. 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554-58 (B.D. Okla. 1995). 
102. United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999). As a result, expert 
testimony concerning the general similarities and differences between a defendant's handwriting 
exemplar and a stick up note was admissible but not the specific conclusion that the defendant was 
the author, because such an opinion lacked empirical validation. /d. at 67-71. 
